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THE EXTRATERRITORIAL REACH OF THE
BANKRUPTCY CODE’S AUTOMATIC STAY:
THEORY VS. PRACTICE

INTRODUCTION

O

ne does not normally have any positive associations with filing
for bankruptcy—and for good reason. After all, being bankrupt
means lacking sufficient funds to pay debts, manage expenses, run a
functioning business, or otherwise meet financial obligations;1 clearly,
then, this predicament is neither comfortable nor enjoyable. However,
the bright side of filing for bankruptcy in the United States⎯if it can be
thought of as such⎯is that the U.S. justice system affords many rights
and protections to debtors so that they do not have to face the perils of
bankruptcy unaided. One such protection is the automatic stay provided
for by § 362 of the United States Bankruptcy Code.2 Whenever a debtor
files for bankruptcy, an estate consisting of all the debtor’s property is

1. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 59–60 (2d pocket ed. 2001).
2. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2005). This section states that:
[A] petition filed under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title . . . operates as a
stay, applicable to all entities, of—(1) the commencement or continuation, including the issuance or employment of process, of a judicial, administrative, or
other action or proceeding against the debtor that was or could have been
commenced before the commencement of the case under this title, or to recover
a claim against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title; (2) the enforcement, against the debtor or against property of the
estate, of a judgment obtained before the commencement of the case under this
title; (3) any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property
from the estate or to exercise control over property of the estate; (4) any act to
create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of the estate; (5) any act to
create, perfect, or enforce against property of the debtor any lien to the extent
that such lien secures a claim that arose before the commencement of the case
under this title; (6) any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the
debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this title; (7) the
setoff of any debt owing to the debtor that arose before the commencement of
the case under this title against any claim against the debtor; and (8) the commencement or continuation of a proceeding before the United States Tax Court
concerning a corporate debtor’s tax liability for a taxable period the bankruptcy
court may determine or concerning the tax liability of a debtor who is an individual for a taxable period ending before the date of the order for relief under
this title.
Id.
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created.3 The automatic stay then operates to protect this property by
prohibiting anyone from making a claim against the property in the estate.4 Put simply, once a debtor properly files for bankruptcy in a U.S.
court, no creditor may initiate or continue a suit seeking to acquire any of
the debtor’s assets.5
At first blush, the automatic stay seems like the perfect protection
mechanism for any given debtor; if a creditor acts to seize or lay claim to
the assets of an individual who has filed a bankruptcy petition, the court
can hold the creditor in violation of the automatic stay and declare the
creditor’s actions void. However, while the automatic stay may operate
flawlessly in theory, various problems can and do arise in its practical
application. For example, what happens if a debtor owns property or assets that lie outside the boundaries of the United States? The language of
11 U.S.C. § 541(a) does indicate that the debtor’s estate is comprised of
all of the debtor’s property, “wherever located.”6 Moreover, similar language is found in 28 U.S.C. § 1334(e).7 This statute, combined with 28
U.S.C. § 157(a),8 operates to give the bankruptcy court, through the district court in which the case is proceeding, “exclusive jurisdiction . . .
[over] all of the property, wherever located . . . .”9 The plain meaning of
this language would seem to imply that “wherever located” means
“wherever in the world,” but does it in actuality? Realistically, can it?
What if the property in question is located in a foreign country such that
it lies outside of the U.S. court’s in rem jurisdiction? Can the U.S. court
still, in fact, control the property? Alternatively, what if the creditor mak3. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (2005).
4. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) (2005). The exceptions to this rule are enumerated in 11
U.S.C. § 362(b) (2005).
5. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2005).
6. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (2005).
7. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(e) (2005). This section states that:
the district court in which a case under title 11 is commenced or is pending
shall have exclusive jurisdiction-(1) of all the property, wherever located, of the debtor as of the commencement of such case, and of property of the estate; and
(2) over all claims or causes of action that involve construction of
section 327 of title 11, United States Code, or rules relating to disclosure requirements under section 327.
Id.
8. 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) (2005) (Each district court may provide that any or all cases
under title 11 and any or all proceedings arising under title 11 or arising in or related to a
case under title 11 shall be referred to the bankruptcy judges for the district).
9. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(e) (2005) (emphasis added).
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ing a claim on a debtor’s property is a foreign entity such that the U.S.
court lacks in personam jurisdiction? Without in personam jurisdiction,
how can a U.S. court take actions against a creditor who violates the
automatic stay? Worse still, what if a foreign court makes a ruling that
operates to seize or compromise the property in question? How then
could a U.S. court possibly declare such a ruling or action void?
This Note will examine the extraterritorial application of the automatic
stay—both in theory and in practice. Specifically, it will discuss and analyze the problems of holding that the automatic stay applies extraterritorially in all situations, especially if the courts continue to hold that all
acts which violate the automatic stay are void. While the rule that the
automatic stay applies extraterritorially operates nicely in theory, the
practical applications of such a holding have proven problematic, at least
insofar as U.S. courts hold that extraterritorial violations of the automatic
stay are void.10 Looking forward, this Note will suggest that the United
States should explore the possibility of pursuing an international convention with other countries that also have stay provisions in their insolvency codes.11
Part I of this Note sets forth background information regarding the
automatic stay and its extraterritorial application. Part II examines the
practical problems that arise from holding that the automatic stay applies
extraterritorially in all situations. Part III then discusses principles of international comity and questions of deference. Part IV goes on to examine stay provisions in foreign jurisdictions. Part V evaluates various aspects of both the United Nations Commission on International Trade
Law’s (“UNCITRAL”) Model Law on Cross Border Insolvency and the
European Community Insolvency Regulation (“EC Regulation”). Finally,
Part VI compares the benefits and drawbacks of the two systems described in Part V and concludes that the best course of action for the
10. See Sinatra v. Gucci (In re Gucci), 309 B.R. 679, 683 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2004),
stating that:
The fact that Congress granted the district courts . . . power to enter orders affecting assets of the debtor, wherever located, does not preclude foreign courts
from exercising jurisdiction over estate property located in their countries, a
matter that raises such questions as to the extraterritorial effect of the automatic
stay and the personal jurisdiction of the United States courts over the entity at
whose behest the foreign court acts.
Id.
11. While the U.S. Bankruptcy Code and the insolvency codes of many other countries provide for an automatic stay, some other countries’ insolvency codes only allow for
non-automatic stays—stays that are entered after a given action occurs, at the request of
one of the parties, or at the discretion of the presiding court. See infra Part IV.A.
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United States to undertake would be to pursue a convention similar to the
EC Regulation.
I. THE AUTOMATIC STAY
Whenever an individual or other entity files a bankruptcy petition under Title 11 of the Untied States Code, an estate is created that embodies
all of the debtor’s property, “wherever located and by whomever held.”12
Additionally, the filing of such a petition triggers an automatic stay that
prohibits any individual or entity from commencing or continuing any
action or proceeding against the debtor.13 In effect, the automatic stay
seals the debtor’s estate14 such that all of the debtor’s assets are protected
from creditors for the duration of the stay.
The automatic stay has several functions, one of which is to protect the
debtor during his or her bankruptcy proceedings.15 Primarily, the automatic stay serves to “prevent the debtor’s estate from being picked to
pieces by creditors”16 so that the bankruptcy court can distribute the
debtor’s assets in a fair and equitable manner.17 The interests of the
debtor are best served if all matters related to the bankruptcy are siphoned into one proceeding, thus avoiding a “chaotic and uncontrolled
scramble for the debtor’s assets in a variety of uncoordinated proceedings in different courts.”18 Additionally, the automatic stay works to protect the estate and preserve it for the creditors’ benefit19 so that creditors
are not forced to compete in a race to the courthouse, with the winner
taking home the bulk of the assets. Finally, the automatic stay also
“serves to protect and preserve the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court so
that the court can administer the debtor’s estate in an orderly fashion.”20
The first court to consider the question of whether the automatic stay
applies extraterritorially was a bankruptcy court in the Southern District

12. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (2005).
13. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) (2005).
14. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (2005).
15. Nakash v. Zur (In re Nakash), 190 B.R. 763, 768 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996).
16. Underwood v. Hillard (In re Rimsat), 98 F.3d 956, 962 (7th Cir. 1996) (citing
Martin-Trigona v. Champion Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n, 892 F.2d 575, 577 (7th Cir.
1989)).
17. GMAM v. Globo Comunicacoes E Participacoes S.A. (In re Globo Comunicacoes
E Participacoes S.A.), 317 B.R. 235, 251 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2004).
18. In re Rimsat, 98 F.3d at 961 (quoting In re Holtkamp, 669 F.2d 505, 508 (7th Cir.
1982)); see also In re Falls Bldg., Ltd., 94 B.R. 471, 480–81 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1988).
19. In re Nakash, 190 B.R. at 768.
20. Id.
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of New York.21 There, the McLean22 court held that the automatic stay
does indeed apply extraterritorially such that foreign entities, in addition
to domestic entities, are bound by the language of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a).23
Since 1987, United States courts have uniformly upheld the extraterritorial application of the automatic stay.24 This trend, however, marks a departure from the general presumption that United States statutes do not
apply outside the boundaries of the United States without express congressional intent.25 In E.E.O.C. v. Arabian American Oil Co. (“Aramco”),
Chief Justice Rehnquist reiterated the “long-standing presumption
against extraterritoriality and validated it as a means by which to effectuate the unexpressed congressional intent that its laws are designed first
and foremost to address domestic conditions.”26 Rehnquist upheld the
importance of this presumption as a means to prevent U.S. law from inadvertently clashing with laws of other nations, thus avoiding “international discord.”27 In deciding Aramco, Rehnquist reasoned that courts
21. In re McLean Industries, 74 B.R. 589 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987). It is surprising that
this question never arose until 1987, but that is apparently the earliest discussion of this
problem. Additionally, since the McLean court does not cite to previous authority for the
proposition that the automatic stay applies extraterritorially, it seems likely that this was
indeed an issue of first impression in 1987.
22. Id. The debtor, a U.S. entity, owned twelve Econoships used to transport goods
internationally. When the debtor filed a Chapter 11 petition, eight of the Econoships were
returned to the United States, but four were arrested overseas in Singapore and Hong
Kong. Courts of those countries issued arrest warrants for the vessels notwithstanding the
automatic stay. Id. at 590–94.
23. Id. at 601 (citing In re McLean Industries, Inc, 68 B.R. 690, 694 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1986)).
24. Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corp. v. Simon (In re Simon), 153 F.3d 991,
996 (9th Cir. 1998); Underwood v. Hillard (In re Rimsat), 98 F.3d 956, 961 (7th Cir.
1996); In re Yukos Oil Co., 321 B.R. 396, 406 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2005); Sinatra v. Gucci
(In re Gucci), 309 B.R. 679, 683–84 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2004); In re Artimm, 278 B.R.
832, 841 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2002); Hobson v. Travelstead (In re Travelstead), 227 B.R.
638, 657–58 (Bankr. D. Md. 1998); Lykes Bros. Steamship Co., Inc., v. Hanseatic Marine Service (In re Lykes Bros. Steamship Co., Inc.), 207 B.R. 282, 287 (Bankr. M.D.
Fla. 1997); Nakash v. Zur (In re Nakash), 190 B.R. 763, 768 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996).
25. David M. Green and Walter Benzija, Spanning the Globe: The Intended Extraterritorial Reach of the Bankruptcy Code, 10 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 85, 85 (2002) (citing E.E.O.C. v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991); Foley Bros., Inc. v.
Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949); American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S.
347 (1909)).
26. Green, supra note 25, at 88 (citing Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. at 248).
In Aramco, a U.S. citizen (Boureslan) was working for a U.S. corporation, Arabian
American Oil Co. (“Aramco”) in Saudi Arabia. Boureslan was fired and he sued in the
United States under Title VII of the Civil Rights Acts of 1964. The question then arose as
to whether this statute, and U.S. statutes in general, apply extraterritorially.
27. Id. (quoting Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. at 248).
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must assume that Congress legislates “against the backdrop of the presumption against extraterritoriality,” and set forth the rule that laws apply
domestically unless Congress made a clear affirmative expression to the
contrary.28 That being established, this Note will now explore the language of the automatic stay provision that portrays Congress’s intent that
the provision apply extraterritorially.
Beginning more broadly, some have argued that Congress intended
that the entire Bankruptcy Code have extraterritorial reach.29 The Ninth
Circuit, for example, adopted this view in HSBC v. Simon (In re Simon)
and held there that the bankruptcy discharge operated extraterritorially.30
One of the major factors that contributed to this holding is the specific
language of 11 U.S.C. § 541(a). This statute states that when a debtor
files a petition for bankruptcy under Title 11, an estate is created composed of all of the debtor’s property, “wherever located and by whomever held.”31 The Simon court found this language to be a clear expression of Congress’s intent that the Code should apply extraterritorially.32
Moreover, it seems necessary that the Bankruptcy Code should have extraterritorial reach in order to “effectuate its principle goals of asset preservation” and ensure fair distribution of the debtor’s property.33 Especially in today’s global marketplace, it defies logic that Congress intended strict guidelines and fair distribution of assets when U.S. entities
were involved, but that these rules and guidelines should evaporate as
soon as foreign entities come into the picture.
That Congress intended the automatic stay to apply extraterritorially is
even more apparent. The language of the automatic stay provision itself
demands that no entity commence or continue any action seeking to acquire property from the debtor,34 and 28 U.S.C. § 1334(e) puts all of the
debtor’s property35 under the control of the district court in which the
28. Id. (quoting Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. at 248).
29. Id. at 92 (“The language, structure and legislative history of the Bankruptcy Code
all suggest that Congress fully intended for it to have extraterritorial application.”).
30. Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corp. v. Simon (In re Simon), 153 F.3d 991,
996 (9th Cir. 1998) (“Congress clearly intended the extraterritorial application of the
Bankruptcy Code.”). Here, the debtor filed for Chapter 7 and received a discharge order.
Afterwards, a foreign creditor who participated in the Chapter 7 proceeding sought to
collect on the discharged debt outside of the United States. The question arose as to
whether a U.S. Bankruptcy Court could sanction the foreign creditor, and the court held
that the discharge operated extraterritorially. Id.
31. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (2005) (emphasis added).
32. 153 F.3d at 996.
33. Green, supra note 25, at 93.
34. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1) (2005).
35. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) created an estate comprised of all of the debtor’s property.
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case is proceeding.36 This control is then passed to the bankruptcy court
through 11 U.S.C. § 157(a).37 The report from the House of Representatives that accompanied the predecessor to 28 U.S.C. § 1334 “states that
the intent of the statute was to ensure that ‘[t]he bankruptcy court is
given in personam jurisdiction as well as in rem jurisdiction to handle
everything that arises in a bankruptcy case.’”38 The language of 28
U.S.C. § 1334 and 11 U.S.C. § 541, viewed in light of their relationships
to the automatic stay provision and coupled with the House report, seem
to rebut the presumption against extraterritoriality and satisfy the standard set down by the Supreme Court in Aramco.39 However, even though
many courts have held that the automatic stay applies extraterritorially,
practical enforcement of the extraterritorial application has proven difficult. The next section will examine some decisions that have dealt with
such problems.
II. PROBLEMS WITH HOLDING THAT THE AUTOMATIC STAY APPLIES
EXTRATERRITORIALLY
In domestic bankruptcy disputes, the case law is clear that “the automatic stay ‘is effective immediately upon the filing of the petition, and
any proceedings or actions described in section 362(a)(1) are void and
without vitality if they occur after the automatic stay takes effect.’”40 If
actions that violate the automatic stay are void and the automatic stay
applies extraterritorially, logic dictates that extraterritorial actions that
violate the automatic stay are likewise void. However, while many courts
have held that the automatic stay applies extraterritorially,41 the practical
reality is that the extraterritorial effect of the automatic stay may depend
on whether a U.S. court has in personam jurisdiction over the violators or

36. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(e) (2005).
37. 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) (2005). Since 28 U.S.C. § 1334(e) specifically gives the district court jurisdiction over the debtor’s estate, the bankruptcy court would have no jurisdiction over the debtor’s assets without 28 U.S.C. § 157. Because section 157 passes
jurisdiction of the debtor’s estate to the bankruptcy court in the district in which the district court sits, the bankruptcy court is able to administer the debtor’s estate.
38. GMAM v. Globo Comunicacoes E Participacoes S.A. (In re Globo Comunicacoes
E Participacoes S.A.), 317 B.R. 235, 251 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2004) (quoting H.R. Rep. No.
95-595 at 445 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 6400) (alteration in original).
39. 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991).
40. Eastern Refractories Co. Inc. v. Forty Eight Insulators Inc., 157 F.3d 169, 172 (2d
Cir. 1998) (quoting Rexnord Holdings, Inc. v. Bidermann, 21 F.3d 522, 527 (2d Cir.
1994)).
41. See supra note 24.
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whether a foreign court will choose to enforce the U.S. court’s orders.42
As a court must first tackle jurisdictional issues before delving into the
merits of a claim, an analysis of those jurisdictional issues which are
prevalent in automatic stay cases follows below.
In order for a bankruptcy court to adjudicate a dispute, it (like any
other court) must have appropriate jurisdiction. Specifically for cases
involving the automatic stay, a court must have in personam jurisdiction
over relevant parties and in rem jurisdiction over the property or assets in
question. While 28 U.S.C. § 1334(e) confers upon a bankruptcy court in
rem jurisdiction over all of the debtor’s property “wherever located,”43
this exercise of custody “creates a fiction that the property—regardless of
its actual location—is legally located within the jurisdictional boundaries
of the district court in which the court sits.”44 Here, it seems that the
Ninth Circuit hit the nail on the head: exercising in rem jurisdiction
through 28 U.S.C. § 1334(e) creates only a fiction that the bankruptcy
court can control the debtor’s property if that property lies outside the
territorial boundaries of the United States. In actuality, the courts of the
country in which the property is physically located are the only entities
that can determine what will happen to that property.45 Moreover, if foreign creditors violate the automatic stay, U.S. bankruptcy courts cannot
protect the debtor’s assets unless the courts can exercise in personam
jurisdiction over the violating entities.46 This has often caused courts to
“[strain] to find a basis for personal jurisdiction over foreign actors by
relying on the legal fiction of in rem jurisdiction.”47 Because of this
straining, courts that technically have in personam jurisdiction over offending foreign creditors may nonetheless find their sanctions or orders

42. See, e.g., Sinatra v. Gucci (In re Gucci), 309 B.R. 679, 684 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
2004) (“As the property in question here is located in Rome, its fate ultimately will be
determined by Italian courts, which will give such weight as they think appropriate to the
decision below.”); Lykes Bros. Steamship Co., Inc., v. Hanseatic Marine Service (In re
Lykes Bros. Steamship Co., Inc.), 207 B.R. 282, 288 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1997) (ordering
sanctions and rulings against Hanseatic without a realistic enforcement mechanism);
Nakash v. Zur (In re Nakash), 190 B.R. 763, 771 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996) (finding that
the Israeli receiver violated the stay but refusing to impose sanctions at the time of the
decision).
43. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(e) (2005).
44. Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corp. v. Simon (In re Simon), 153 F.3d 991,
996 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 327 (1966)).
45. In re Gucci, 309 B.R. at 683–84.
46. Hobson v. Travelstead (In re Travelstead), 227 B.R. 638, 655 (Bankr. D. Md.
1998) (“[I]n personam jurisdiction is required before the court may restrain a defendant
from interfering with that property.”).
47. Green, supra note 25, at 109 (alteration added).
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useless in preventing the foreign creditors from continuing to violate the
automatic stay. An examination of cases that exemplify these issues follows below.
A. Exercising In Personam Jurisdiction over Foreign Entities
As stated above, when faced with the difficult question of whether the
automatic stay applies extraterritorially, U.S. bankruptcy courts have
been in complete agreement in answering affirmatively.48 Moreover,
when foreign entities violate the automatic stay by interfering with the
debtor’s property after a U.S. bankruptcy petition has been filed, U.S.
bankruptcy courts have consistently held that they have in personam jurisdiction over the violator.49 This holding is necessary because without
in personam jurisdiction, the U.S. court would be unable to enforce its
holding or in any way hold the violator accountable.50 However, the case
law has made it quite clear that even if a bankruptcy court asserts in personam jurisdiction over the foreign entity, it may nevertheless be unable
to prevent that entity from interfering with the debtor’s property without
assistance from a foreign court. Examples of this phenomenon follow
below.
1. In re Lykes Bros. Steamship Co., Inc.
Lykes, an international shipping company, filed a Chapter 11 petition
in October of 1995.51 Prior to the petition date, Lykes charted two vessels
from non-U.S. companies: the M/V Altonia from Altonia Schiffahrtsgesellschaft mbh & Co. and the M/V Arabella from the Andrea Shipping
(PTH) Ltd.52 Lykes returned both ships to their respective owners before
filing its bankruptcy petition, but both Altonia and Andrea claimed that
Lykes owed them money based on pre-petition breaches of the charters.53
48. See supra note 24.
49. GMAM v. Globo Comunicacoes E Participacoes S.A. (In re Globo Comunicacoes
E Participacoes S.A.), 317 B.R. 235, 252 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2004); Lykes Bros. Steamship
Co., Inc., v. Hanseatic Marine Service (In re Lykes Bros. Steamship Co., Inc.), 207 B.R.
282, 285 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1997); Nakash v. Zur (In re Nakash), 190 B.R. 763, 767
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996).
50. In re Travelstead, 227 B.R. at 655 (“But even though the court may have in rem
jurisdiction over the debtor’s property, in personam jurisdiction is required before the
court may restrain a defendant from interfering with that property.”).
51. In re Lykes Bros., 207 B.R. at 284.
52. Id. The text of the decision makes it clear that the M/V Arabella was chartered
from a Singapore company, but it does not state from which country the M/V Altonia
came.
53. Id. Altonia claimed that Lykes owes it approximately $130,000 and Andrea
claimed that Lykes owes it about $30,000. Id.
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Five days after Lykes had filed its Chapter 11 petition, Andrea and Altonia assigned their claims against Lykes to a German company called
Hanseatic Marine Service GmbH; this action was held to violate the
automatic stay.54 About five months later, in March of 1997, Hanseatic
truly broke the peace by procuring the arrest of another of Lykes’ ships,
the M/V Stella Lykes, in a court in Belgium “in order to compel payment
of the pre-petition claims purportedly assigned by Andrea and Altonia.”55
The Lykes court properly began its analysis with a discussion as to
whether it could exercise in personam jurisdiction over the various defendants.56 The court dispensed with Andrea very quickly, asserting that
it “[c]learly . . . has personal jurisdiction over Andrea Shipping because
Andrea filed a claim . . . and has therefore consented to the jurisdiction
of the United States Bankruptcy Court.”57 While the case law may be
clear on this point, the court still found it difficult to require Andrea to
act according to the court’s direction.58 Because Andrea was not a U.S.based entity, the U.S. court was limited with regard to the sanctions it
could realistically enforce against Andrea.59 Any sanctions that the court
did impose would only be effective if Andrea had assets physically located in the United States—otherwise, Andrea (absent a court order from
its country of incorporation) would have no incentive to submit to sanctions of a U.S. court.60
54. Id. at 284–85. While the assignment of claims normally does not violate the
automatic stay, the court found that Hanseatic was created for the sole purpose of avoiding the automatic stay seeing as it was actually created five days after the assignments
were made. Therefore, the court held that this particular assignment did violate the stay.
55. Id. at 285.
56. Id.
57. If an individual files a claim in or invokes the aid/protection of a U.S. bankruptcy
court, that individual has submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court and
must therefore abide by the consequences of the related bankruptcy proceedings. In re
Lykes Bros., 207 B.R. at 285–86 (citing Langenkamp v. Kulp, 498 U.S. 42, 111 S.Ct.
330, 112 L.Ed.2d 343 (1990)); Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 327 (1966); Gardner v.
New Jersey, 329 U.S. 565, 573 (1947); In re Schwinn Bicycle Co., 182 B.R. 526, 530
(Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1995); In re Am. Exp. Group Int’l. Serv., Inc., 167 B.R. 311, 316
(Bankr. D.Colo 1994).
58. In re Lykes Bros., 207 B.R. at 286 (“Having voluntarily filed its proof of claim in
this reorganization case, Andrea purposefully submitted itself to this Court’s jurisdiction
and was obligated to comply with its orders and with its procedures. Neither it nor its
purported transferee did so.”).
59. See Container Leasing International, LLC v. Navicon, S.A., No.
CIV303CV00101, 2006 WL 861012 at *7 (D. Conn. Mar. 31, 2006); Global Marine
Shipping (No. 10) Ltd. v. Finning Intern, Inc., No. CIV.A.101–1901, 2002 WL 126932 at
*5 (E.D. La. Jan. 29, 2002).
60. See Container Leasing International, 2006 WL 861012 at *7; Global Marine
Shipping, 2002 WL 126932 at *5.
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The Lykes court found that it had in personam jurisdiction over Altonia
as well, but for a different reason.61 Here, the court relied on a minimum
contacts analysis.62 This analysis is more compelling than the analysis
regarding Andrea,63 but Altonia could also have chosen to disregard any
orders made by this court unless Altonia owned assets that were physically located in the United States.64 If Altonia owned no assets in the
United States and decided it no longer needed the benefits of dealing
with the United States courts, why would it accept sanctions?
The most troubling part of this opinion is the single sentence that this
court devoted to establishing its in personam jurisdiction over Hanseatic.65 Here, the court stated, “[w]hile nothing in the record warrants
the conclusion that Haneastic is subject to the personal jurisdiction of
this Court, it cannot be gainsaid that this Court’s jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1334(d) grants this Court jurisdiction over all property of the
estate wheresoever located.”66 In making this assertion, the court “acknowledged that there was no traditional basis upon which to base personal jurisdiction over [Hanseatic], ultimately relying on [Hanseatic’s]
continuing knowledge that its actions . . . would have the effect of disrupting the debtor’s U.S. bankruptcy case and its property.”67 Based on
this precariously justified assertion of in personam jurisdiction, the bankruptcy court went on to order that Hanseatic be enjoined from taking further steps to collect any assets from the debtor and that Haneastic must
61. In re Lykes Bros., 207 B.R. at 286.
62. Id. at 286–87. Here, the court discussed eight points from the record to demonstrate that Altonia did indeed have minimum contacts with the United States. Those
points include the facts that Altonia: 1) entered into a charter with Lykes; 2) agreed to
deliver the vessel to Lykes in New York; 3) agreed to accept re-delivery of the vessel in
New York; 4) allowed the chartered vessel to call on ports in the United States; 5) agreed
in the charter that all bills of lading issued under the charter be subject to the Carriage of
Goods by Sea Act of the United States; 6) agreeing that Altonia would be bound by the
U.S. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986; 7) entered into a Certificate of Financial Responsibility with the United States Coast Guard, and; 8) agreed that Altonia would remain responsible for the navigation of the vessel, knowing that it would call on United States ports.
63. The reasoning with regard to Altonia is more compelling because the court had
jurisdiction over Altonia independent of the instant bankruptcy proceedings—this seems
more legitimate the “jurisdiction by ambush” to which Andrea was subject.
64. See Container Leasing International, 2006 WL 861012 at *7; Global Marine
Shipping, 2002 WL 126932 at *5.
65. In re Lykes Bros., 207 B.R. at 287.
66. Id. Note that here the court cited to 28 U.S.C. § 1334(d) for the “wherever located” provision, but 28 U.S.C. § 1334(e) currently holds this language. In fact, § 1334(d)
did contain the “wherever located” provision until the code was amended in 1994. This
provision appears in § 1334(e) today.
67. Green, supra note 25, at 109 (alterations added).
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immediately drop any open actions against the debtor anywhere in the
world.68
How can this be? Under what set of bizarre and improbable circumstances would Hanseatic actually submit to the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court and decide to follow its orders? At least Andrea and Altonia
are companies that had previously had dealings with the United States,
either through voluntary court proceedings or minimum contacts in business transactions.69 Because of these previous dealings, it is conceivable—if not probable—that these companies had assets in the United
States and would therefore have agreed to comply with orders of the
bankruptcy court.70 Hanseatic, however, is a completely different story.
If the Lykes court was right—and it seems that it was—Hanseatic was
created solely for the purpose of contravening the automatic stay and
pursuing the debtor’s assets despite the previously filed Chapter 11 petition.71 Essentially, Hanseatic was only subject to the personal jurisdiction
of the Lykes court because Hanseatic was in possession of Lykes’s vessel, as provided for by 28 U.S.C. § 1334(e).72 Only by relying on the fiction that the bankruptcy court can exercise in rem jurisdiction over the
property,73 and by straining this fiction to an extreme degree in order to
exercise in personam jurisdiction over the violator,74 could the bankruptcy court claim that it had the proper jurisdiction to issue orders to
Hanseatic. This reasoning is dubious at best.
2. In re Nakash
Joseph Nakash was a member of the board of directors of an Israeli
banking institution called The North American Bank, Ltd.75 The institution was declared insolvent, and Nakash filed a voluntary petition under
Chapter 11 in the United States in October 1994. He filed this petition in
response to a $160 million judgment entered against him in Israel in December 1993.76 In order to enforce the judgment, the Official Receiver of
the State of Israel (the “receiver”) commenced an action in the Eastern
68. In re Lykes Bros., 207 B.R. at 288.
69. Id. at 285–87.
70. See Container Leasing International, 2006 WL 861012 at *7; Global Marine
Shipping, 2002 WL 126932 at *5.
71. In re Lykes Bros., 207 B.R. at 285.
72. Id. at 287.
73. Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corp. v. Simon (In re Simon), 153 F.3d 991,
996 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 327 (1966)).
74. Green, supra note 25, at 109.
75. Nakash v. Zur (In re Nakash), 190 B.R. 763, 766 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996).
76. Id.
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District of New York, seeking an order of attachment.77 The district court
granted the order.78 Then, on January 16, 1995, the receiver filed an involuntary petition in Israel against Nakash.79 Nakash responded by filing
an adversary proceeding, claiming that the receiver had violated the
automatic stay by filing the involuntary petition in Israel.80
Like the Lykes court, this court began with a discussion of jurisdiction.81 And, as in Lykes, the bankruptcy court quickly established that it
had in personam jurisdiction over the receiver because the receiver had
“submitted himself to the courts of the United States, including this
court, by, inter alia, seeking attachment in the Eastern District of New
York . . . .”82 This exercise of jurisdiction is similar to that which the Lykes court exercised over Andrea, but with one important distinction: Andrea was a foreign company whereas the receiver was an agent of a foreign government.83
This raises the question of whether a bankruptcy court can sanction an
agent of a foreign government.84 It seems clear that with Andrea, the
U.S. court could have been able to lay some sanctions on its own, but
with the receiver, the U.S. court is powerless to enforce any punishment
at all (short of physically apprehending the receiver) without the assistance and approval of the Israeli government.85 Here, the differences be77. Id. at 767.
78. Id.
79. Id. This was the second involuntary petition that the receiver filed against Nakash
in Israel. The first was in January 1993, but the Israeli court dismissed that proceeding.
The receiver appealed and the Supreme Court of Israel reversed and remanded, but no
hearing date was set. Id. at 766–67.
80. In re Nakash, 190 B.R. at 767.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 767–78 (citing Fotochrome, Inc v. Copal Co., Ltd., 517 F.2d 512 (2d Cir.
1975)); See also In re Deak & Co., Inc., 63 B.R. 422, 433 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986). The
Nakash court also sought to strengthen its assertion by stating that in the process of seeking the attachment, the receiver appeared through New York counsel, filed pleadings,
filed a proof of claim, and participated in a discovery exchange program.
83. Lykes Bros. Steamship Co., Inc., v. Hanseatic Marine Service (In re Lykes Bros.
Steamship Co., Inc.), 207 B.R. 282, 284 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1997); In re Nakash, 190 B.R.
at 765.
84. While there are definitely Act of State and Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
issues lurking here, a discussion of these issues is beyond the scope of this Note. This
discussion assumes that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act does not bar jurisdiction
and that the Act of State Doctrine does not prohibit the U.S. court from sitting in judgment of the acts in question.
85. GMAM v. Globo Comunicacoes E Participacoes S.A. (In re Globo Comunicacoes
E Participacoes S.A.), 317 B.R. 235, 250 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“[T]he bankruptcy
court may not be able to secure compliance with such orders except to the degree that it
may either assert personal jurisdiction . . . or obtain cooperation from courts in foreign
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tween the theoretical and practical approaches to handling the extraterritorial application of the automatic stay are glaringly evident; holding that
the stay applies extraterritorially works well in theory, but ensuring that
such a holding is respected is another matter entirely. Especially in this
case, it seems extremely unlikely that an Israeli court would have approved of sanctions against the receiver in light of the fact that the Jerusalem court endorsed a motion by the receiver in which he requested permission from that court to file the 1995 involuntary petition notwithstanding the Chapter 11 proceedings.86 While the Nakash court did find
that the receiver violated the automatic stay, it could not declare the receiver’s actions void and chose to leave the issue of sanctions and damages for another time.87 This decision, unlike that of the Lykes court,
avoided a scenario in which a U.S. court issues an order that it cannot
effectively enforce.
B. Exercising In Rem Jurisdiction Over Property Located Abroad
As noted above, 28 U.S.C. § 1334(e) gives the district court—and ultimately the associated bankruptcy court—jurisdiction over all of the
debtor’s assets, “wherever located.”88 It is from this statute that U.S.
courts derive the fiction that the debtor’s property sits within the reach of
the court and thus the power to exercise in rem jurisdiction over that
property.89 The major problem which emerges here is that this idea that
28 U.S.C. § 1334(e) actually gives a U.S. court in rem jurisdiction is just
what the In re Simon court said it is: a fiction.90 But what happens when
a foreign court—a court in the country in which the debtor’s property
actually sits—disagrees with the U.S. court and issues orders affecting
the property? This was one major issue that surfaced in In re Gucci.91

jurisdictions. . . . Furthermore, a foreign court might hypothetically issue conflicting orders . . . pursuant to the foreign court’s own view of its jurisdiction . . . .”); Hobson v.
Travelstead (In re Travelstead), 227 B.R. 638, 655 (Bankr. D. Md. 1998) (“[A] U.S. court
order would be enforceable in another country (in the absence of a treaty or convention)
only to the extent that the foreign courts” are compelled to enforce it.) (citing In re Mctague, 198 B.R. 428, 430 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1996)).
86. In re Nakash, 190 B.R. at 767.
87. Id. at 771.
88. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(e) (2005); 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) (2005).
89. Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corp. v. Simon (In re Simon), 153 F.3d 991,
996 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 327 (1966)).
90. Id. See also Green, supra note 25, at 98.
91. Sinatra v. Gucci (In re Gucci), 309 B.R. 679 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2004).
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1. In re Gucci
Paolo Gucci, the debtor, owned a store in Rome, Italy.92 In February
1994,93 he filed a Chapter 11 petition in the United States.94 A month
later, his cousin, Maurizio, obtained an arbitration award against Paolo in
Switzerland and registered a lien against the Rome property.95 Several
years later, in May 2000, the trustee of Paolo’s estate filed suit against
Maurizio’s estate alleging that Maurizio had violated the automatic stay
by obtaining the Swiss award and registering the lien after Paolo had
filed for Chapter 11.96 The bankruptcy court ruled for the trustee because
“[t]he lien was registered pursuant to a decision of an Italian court after
the automatic stay was in effect . . . .”97 Defendants appealed to the district court on several grounds, one of which being that the automatic stay
should not have been applied in this case.98
In analyzing this issue, the district court followed the model that other
courts dealing with the extraterritorial application of the automatic stay
had set forth and thus began with a jurisdictional discussion.99 Like many
courts have done before, this court cited 28 U.S.C. § 1334(e)100 and 28
U.S.C. § 157(a),101 emphasizing the “wherever located” language.102 The
court then went on to proclaim that this case did not involve—contrary to
the defendants’ assertions—a conflict between the bankruptcy court and
92. Id. at 681.
93. In re Gucci, No. 06-0496-bk, 2006 WL 2671970 at *1 (2d Cir. Sept. 18, 2006).
This is an appellate decision that took place after the above-cited case (309 B.R. 679) was
remanded and decided again by the district court. I cite to the appellate decision here
because the above-cited case omitted background facts and the district court’s opinion on
remand made an error as to the date of the Chapter 11 filing. That opinion stated that
Paolo filed in February 2005, which cannot be correct. I believe February 1994 to be the
correct date of the Chapter 11 filing as it makes sense in the timeline and because the
courts that recount the background facts agree on all other dates.
94. The cases give no indication as to why Paolo Gucci, who owned property in
Rome, filed Chapter 11 in the United States. One can only assume that he owned assets in
the United States as well.
95. In re Gucci, No. 05-Civ-4444(DC), 2005 WL 3150709 at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 28,
2005).
96. Id. at *2.
97. 309 B.R. at 681.
98. Id.
99. Id. The only discussion here was about in rem jurisdiction—because of the nature
of the claim, a discussion of in personam jurisdiction was not necessary. Specifically, the
court was only concerned with being able to exercise jurisdiction over the store in Rome
(in rem), and not a person or other legal entity requiring in personam jurisdiction. Id.
100. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(e) (2005).
101. 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) (2005).
102. In re Gucci, 309 B.R. at 681–82.
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the Italian court.103 Here, defendants claimed that by ruling for Gucci
below, the bankruptcy court declared an act of the Italian court void ab
initio.104 However, the district court disagreed; it stated that the bankruptcy court declared void “the registration of the Italian judgment lien,”
as a matter of U.S. law only.105 In other words, the only thing that the
bankruptcy court declared void was the registration of this lien in the
United States as it related to Gucci’s Chapter 11 case. The bankruptcy
court—or any U.S. court for that matter—could not declare the judgment
lien itself void because that lien was the result of an act of an Italian
court.106 The court then went on to explain in greater detail:
The Bankruptcy Court neither purported to alter, nor could have altered, ownership interests in the Italian real estate in the same sense as
in cases in which the property is within the physical power or territorial
jurisdiction of an in rem court. The fact that Congress granted the district courts, and via their referral, the bankruptcy courts power to enter
orders affecting assets of the debtor, wherever located, does not preclude foreign courts from exercising jurisdiction over estate property
located in their countries, a matter that raises such questions as to the
extraterritorial effect of the automatic stay and the personal jurisdiction
of the Untied States courts over an entity at whose behest a foreign
court acts.107

Finally, the district court concluded that since “the property in question
here is located in Rome, its fate will ultimately be determined by Italian
courts, which will give such weight as they think appropriate to the decision below.”108
This decision is extremely important because the court acknowledged
and embraced the problem with holding that the automatic stay applies
extraterritorially,109 unlike other courts, which simply held that the automatic stay does apply across borders without citing the difficulties and

103. Id. at 683.
104. Id.
105. Id. (emphasis in original).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 683–84 (citing 1 KING, ET AL., COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 3.01[5], at 3-32
to 3-33 (15th ed. rev. 2003)) (“[T]he extraterritorial jurisdiction of the United States
courts for these purposes is in personam rather than in rem. If a creditor causes property
of a title 11 estate to be seized in a foreign country, that creditor has violated the automatic stay. Whether that creditor can be punished, however, is a function of that creditor’s amenability to the United States process. By the same token, a United States court
cannot control the action of the foreign court irrespective of section 1334(e).”).
108. In re Gucci, 309 B.R. at 684.
109. Id.
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consequences that invariably accompany such a holding.110 Once courts
realize that the exercise of in rem jurisdiction over property located
abroad truly is a fiction,111 and that a holding predicated on that fiction
may prove futile,112 U.S. courts and legislatures may begin to think about
what can be done to avoid this unfavorable situation.
III. INTERNATIONAL COMITY AND THE QUESTION OF DEFERENCE
Upon being sued for allegedly violating the automatic stay, foreign
creditors often defend themselves by asserting that the automatic stay
should not apply to them for reasons of international comity.113 The Supreme Court defined the term “comity” over a century ago, and that classic definition is still consistently cited today:
“Comity,” in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation,
on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the other.
But it is the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to
the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, having due
regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of
its own citizens, or of other persons who are under the protection of its
laws.114

Under principles of comity, U.S. courts normally “refuse to review acts
of foreign governments and defer to proceedings taking place in foreign
countries, allowing those acts and proceedings to have extraterritorial
effect in the United States.”115 However, comity is not a strict rule of
law—rather, it is a rule of “practice, convenience and expediency.”116
Therefore, in instances in which extending comity to a foreign entity
would mandate a result contrary to U.S. policy, the U.S. court should
decline the foreign entity’s request.117 According to the Second Circuit,
U.S. courts are not obligated to extend comity if doing so would be con-

110. See, e.g., Nakash v. Zur (In re Nakash), 190 B.R. 763, 768 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1996); Lykes Bros. Steamship Co., Inc. v. Hanseatic Marine Service (In re Lykes Bros.
Steamship Co., Inc.), 207 B.R. 282, 287 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1997).
111. Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corp. v. Simon (In re Simon), 153 F.3d 991,
996 (9th Cir. 1998).
112. See In re Gucci, 309 B.R. at 683–84. See also Green, supra note 25 at 98.
113. See, e.g., Hobson v. Travelstead (In re Travelstead), 227 B.R. 638, 654–56
(Bankr. D. Md. 1998); In re Nakash, 190 B.R. at 770.
114. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 164–65 (1895).
115. Pravin Banker Associates, Ltd. v. Banco Popular Del Peru, 109 F.3d 850, 854 (2d
Cir. 1997).
116. Id.
117. Id.
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trary to strong public policy.118 So the question then arises: should U.S.
courts grant comity to foreign laws or proceedings if it means allowing a
foreign entity to violate the automatic stay?
A. In re Travelstead
Mr. Travelstead (the debtor) and Ms. Hobson had acquired a Dutch
corporation called Blockless in which Travelstead owned an eighty percent interest and Hobson a twenty percent interest.119 In December 1995,
the debtor borrowed AUS$4,900,000120 from Blockless (with Hobson’s
consent), but then failed to repay the loans when they were due.121 In
May 1996, Hobson sued the debtor in the Netherlands to compel repayment, and a Dutch court ordered the debtor to repay immediately.122 Instead of repaying the loans, the debtor filed for Chapter 11 in the United
States.123 Subsequently, Hobson petitioned the Dutch court to order the
debtor to purchase all of her shares in Blockless, and the Dutch court
complied.124 Travelstead then sued Hobson in the United States, alleging
that her attempts to compel payment and her pursuit of the buyout order
violated the automatic stay.125 In her defense, Hobson claimed that the
U.S. court should abstain from hearing the case based on principles of
international comity.126
After an examination of U.S. case law setting forth the principles of international comity, the court addressed Hobson’s claim that the debtor’s
Chapter 11 reorganization plan conflicted with the Dutch order.127 Specifically, Hobson asserted that the Dutch order required that the debtor
repay Blockless immediately and that the debtor buy Hobson’s shares at
the same time that she tendered them.128 The plan, on the other hand, provided that the debtor repay Blockless within two years and that the
118. Id. (quoting Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909,
937 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
119. Hobson v. Travelstead (In re Travelstead), 227 B.R. 638, 642 (Bankr. D. Md.
1998).
120. On December 1, 1995, AUS$4,900,000 amounted to USD$3,612,280. See
http://www.jeico.co.kr/cnc57aus.html (last visited Aug. 1, 2007).
121. In re Travelstead, 227 B.R. at 642.
122. Id.
123. Id. The case does not specify why the debtor was able to file a U.S. Bankruptcy
petition in this instance, but foreign debtors can file in the United States if they have a
domicile in the United States or if they have assets located in the United States.
124. Id. at 643.
125. Id.
126. In re Travelstead, 227 B.R. at 654–58.
127. Id. at 656.
128. Id.
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debtor could choose not to pay Hobson at the time she tendered her
shares.129 Although the court recognized these differences, it ultimately
decided that “the Plan defers to the Dutch Judgments far more than it
conflicts with them,” because the claims themselves were preserved and
determined under Dutch law.130 Therefore, the court determined that it
was not proper or necessary to abstain from hearing the debtor’s case
based on considerations of international comity.131
B. In re Nakash
The Israeli receiver, who filed an involuntary bankruptcy case against
Nakash (the debtor) in Israel after the debtor filed for Chapter 11 in the
United States,132 defended his case by asserting that even if the automatic
stay applied extraterritorially, principles of international comity required
that the U.S. court find that the he did not violate the automatic stay.133
Specifically, the receiver asserted that subjecting him to the automatic
stay would create a direct conflict between American and Israeli law.134
The court, however, chose to focus on the acts of the receiver himself
rather than on the Israeli court’s ruling.135 The court ultimately ruled that
comity did not require it to “respect or defer to the acts of a judgment
creditor.”136
In reaching these decisions, the courts did not spell out their policy reasons for declining to grant comity with regard to the automatic stay.
However, when one considers the primary purpose of the automatic
stay—to “prevent the debtor’s estate from being picked to pieces by
creditors”137 so that the bankruptcy court can distribute the debtor’s assets in a fair and equitable manner,138—one can readily surmise that extending comity by disregarding the automatic stay would be contrary to
the policy of protecting a U.S. debtor and preserving the debtor’s estate
for the benefit of the creditors. Therefore, since courts should not extend
comity in instances in which doing so would be contrary to U.S. pol129. Id.
130. Id. at 657.
131. In re Travelstead, 227 B.R. at 658.
132. Nakash v. Zur (In re Nakash), 190 B.R. 763, 766–67 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996).
133. Id. at 770.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Underwood v. Hillard (In re Rimsat), 98 F.3d 965, 961 (7th Cir. 1996) (citing
Martin-Trigona v. Champion Federal Savings and Loan Ass’n, 892 F.2d 575, 577 (7th
Cir. 1989)).
138. GMAM v. Globo Comunicacoes E Participacoes S.A. (In re Globo Comunicacoes
E Participacoes S.A.), 317 B.R. 235, 251 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2004).
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icy,139 they should not extend comity to foreign actors when doing so
would allow the actor to avoid the automatic stay.
IV. AUTOMATIC STAY PROVISIONS AROUND THE GLOBE: A
COMPARATIVE EXERCISE ENABLING DEVELOPMENT TOWARDS
FEASIBLE SOLUTIONS
A. Automatic Stay Provisions in Foreign Jurisdictions
The United States is not the only country in the world whose bankruptcy code has adopted an automatic stay provision—far from it. In particular, many European Union (“EU”)140 countries have incorporated
automatic stay provisions into their bankruptcy codes.141 Others have
adopted stay provisions that are not automatic, but are triggered by an
action or at the discretion of the court or one of the parties.142 Some of
these provisions are similar to the U.S. automatic stay, while others are
very different with regard to scope, duration, and severity.143 Before addressing a solution to a problem, one must understand all aspects of that
problem. Since international insolvency is a two-way street, understanding how foreign countries treat their bankruptcy proceedings is essential
to developing an international solution that foreign countries will receive
favorably.
1. France
In order to better enable businesses to restructure while continuing to
operate, France instituted a new preservation procedure in its Commercial Code.144 Similar to Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, the
preservation procedure provides for a restructuring plan to be drawn up
by the debtor so that the debtor can repay its liabilities and continue to

139. Pravin Banker Associates, Ltd. v. Banco Popular Del Peru, 109 F.3d 850, 854 (2d
Cir. 1997).
140. The European Union consists of twenty-seven member states: Austria, Belgium,
Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.
For more information, see EUROPA, http://europa.eu/abc/european_countries/
index_en.htm (last visited Aug. 1, 2007).
141. See CHARLES D. SCHMERLER & JAMES R. SILKENAT, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL
INSOLVENCIES AND DEBT RESTRUCTURINGS 228, 259, 370, 397 (Charles D. Schmerler ed.,
Oxford University Press 2006) [hereinafter SCHMERLER & SILKENAT].
142. Id. at 150, 337, 384.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 150.
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operate simultaneously.145 According to the Code, the preservation procedure is available to any debtor who can show that he is in a situation
that will probably lead to a suspension of payments.146 In order to best
protect the debtor during his period of restructuring, “the institution of a
preservation proceeding triggers a stay of proceedings.”147 Specifically,
the opening of a procedure begins with an “observation period,” during
which secured creditors are not entitled to enforce their security.148 This
is similar to U.S. law in that a stay is automatically triggered, but differs
in that the French stay will not last indefinitely.149
2. Ireland
Under Ireland’s Companies Act of 1990, the issuing of a bankruptcy
petition immediately triggers a “protection period.”150 Under this protection period, no proceedings can be opened or continued against the
debtor without permission from the court.151 This protection period begins on the date the petition is filed and lasts for a maximum of one hundred days.152 As with France’s stay provision, Ireland’s is similar to the
U.S. automatic stay in that other proceedings are stayed automatically
and immediately, but the stay does not last for the entire length of the
insolvency proceedings.153 Additionally, it is significant that Ireland’s
stay provision states that proceedings already in motion cannot be continued.154 This idea is also found in U.S. law, but it is not prevalent in the
bankruptcy laws of many other EU countries.
3. Italy
Italian bankruptcy proceedings are similar to U.S. Chapter 7 actions in
that they are aimed at liquidating the debtor’s assets and paying off creditors on a priority basis.155 One of the main effects of an Italian bankruptcy petition is a “stay of enforcement proceedings,” under which

145. Id. at 150–51.
146. Id. at 151.
147. SCHMERLER & SILKENAT, supra note 141, at 151.
148. Id. at 153. This “observation period” lasts for six months, and it can be extended
for an additional six months if the bankruptcy court grants leave. However, it is unclear
how this stay affects proceedings that are already underway.
149. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2005).
150. SCHMERLER & SILKENAT, supra note 141, at 228.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2005).
154. SCHMERLER & SILKENAT, supra note 141, at 228.
155. Id. at 259.
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“creditors are not entitled to start or continue any enforcement proceedings over the assets of the company.”156 Like U.S. and Irish law, the Italian stay is also automatic and covers actions already in motion.157
4. The Netherlands
The stay provision in the Netherlands is much less stringent than are
stay provisions of most other countries. Primarily, a stay will not automatically go into effect upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition; rather, a
stay will only be entered at the request of the receiver or an interested
party.158 Secondly, if the court does issue a stay order, the order will only
last for a maximum of two months, with one possible two-month extension.159 Lastly, the stay order will not completely bar creditors from acting against the debtor; instead, it will prevent third parties from taking
“recourse against any asset falling within the bankruptcy estate” or
“claim any assets which are in control of the debtor or the receiver”
without permission from the court.160 Unlike the other stays that have
been discussed thus far, this stay still enables creditors to act against the
debtor—just not without court permission.
5. Spain
Spain’s stay provision, like some others discussed above, operates
much more as a “waiting period” than an actual stay of proceedings.161
Specifically, once a bankruptcy petition is filed, secured creditors are
prevented from enforcing their security until the earlier of one of two
dates: the date when the debtor allows secured creditors to act, or the
date one year from when the petition was filed if liquidation has not yet
begun.162 The purpose of this waiting period, just as we have seen in
other jurisdictions, is to “protect the viability of the debtor’s business”
while the insolvency proceedings are underway.163 However, it is important to note that this waiting period only applies if the assets in question
relate to the “debtor’s ordinary business.” If they do not, secured creditors can institute enforcement proceedings at any time.164 This is a direct
contrast with U.S. law, under which an estate comprised of all the
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 345.
Id.
SCHMERLER & SILKENAT, supra note 141, at 345.
Id. at 370.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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debtor’s assets is created, and creditors are stayed from acting against
any asset in the estate.165
6. The United Kingdom
Once an insolvency administration begins in the United Kingdom, a
statutory moratorium goes into effect.166 This moratorium, like many
other stay provisions discussed above, has the effect of preventing creditors from reaching the debtor’s assets for the duration of the moratorium.167 Specifically, the moratorium mandates that creditors may not
take any steps towards enforcing any security held by the debtor.168 As
with the U.S. automatic stay, the U.K. moratorium remains in effect for
as long as the debtor remains in its bankruptcy administration.169
B. U.S. Case Law Dealing with Foreign Automatic Stay Provisions
Given the fact that many countries other than the United States have
stay provisions—some automatic—in their bankruptcy codes, an obvious
question arises: if foreign states claim extraterritorial application of their
stay provisions, will and should U.S. courts respect those claims of extraterritorial reach? This question has been answered affirmatively by In re
Artimm170 and In re Rosacometta.171
Both Artimm and Rosacometta delt with the extraterritorial application
of the Italian automatic stay.172 In both cases, bankruptcy proceedings
were already underway in Italy, and the Italian trustee for the debtor
brought an ancillary case in the United States under § 304 of the U.S.
Bankruptcy Code173 in order to prevent U.S. creditors from acting on assets that the debtor possessed in the United States.174 The Artimm court
began its discussion of the Italian automatic stay by citing that stay provision and finding that Italian law maintains that the Italian automatic
165. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (2005).
166. SCHMERLER & SILKENAT, supra note 141, at 397. See also England’s Insolvency
Act, 1986, c. 45, sched. B1, para. 44 (Eng.), available at http://www.iiiglobal.
org/country/united_kingdom/England_1986_Insolvency_Act_Complete_2004.pdf (last
visited Aug. 1, 2007).
167. SCHMERLER & SILKENAT, supra note 141, at 397.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. In re Artimm, 278 B.R. 832 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2002).
171. Rosacometta S.R.L. v. Empire Marble and Granite, Inc. (In re Rosacometta), 336
B.R. 557 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2005).
172. In re Rosacometta, 336 B.R. at 562; In re Artimm, 278 B.R. at 840.
173. Section 304 no longer exists because it was placed by Chapter 15 in October
2005.
174. In re Rosacometta, 336 B.R. at 559; In re Artimm, 278 B.R. at 835.
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stay applies extraterritorially.175 The court then went on to discuss the
applicable EU law and found that under that law, the Italian automatic
stay would apply throughout the European Union.176 The court reasoned
that the EU law supported the determination that the Italian automatic
stay should apply extraterritorially, and also added that
[i]t is particularly appropriate that a United States Bankruptcy court
recognize the extraterritorial reach of the Italian automatic stay [because] . . . the United States cannot expect that foreign courts will recognize the extraterritorial reach of its own automatic stay . . . if its
courts do not equally recognize the impact in the United States of a foreign automatic stay.177

In In re Rosacometta, decided three years after In re Artimm, the court
relied heavily upon the Artimm decision in order to arrive at the same
conclusion.178 This cooperative attitude within the realm of international
insolvencies is essential in order to handle these insolvencies in our increasingly global marketplace.179
V. WORKING TOWARDS SOLUTIONS: EC REGULATION 1346/2000 AND
UNCITRAL’S MODEL LAW ON CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY
Having already recognized this problem, various international bodies
within our global community have begun proposing legislation to facilitate extraterritorially-applicable automatic stay provisions. Two legislative acts that have already been implemented could provide viable solutions: the European Union’s EC Regulation 1346/2000 and
UNCITRAL’s Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency.
A. EC Regulation 1346/2000
On May 29, 2000, the European Union passed Council Regulation No.
1346/2000 (“EC Regulation”).180 The European Union realized that
cross-border insolvencies were becoming more and more prevalent in the
increasingly global market, and it therefore took measures to promote
175. In re Artimm, 278 B.R. at 840.
176. Id. at 841.
177. Id.
178. In re Rosacometta, 336 B.R. at 563.
179. See Judith Elkin & Autumn Smith, Chapter 15 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code: New
Procedures for Cross Border Insolvencies, 888 PLI/COMM 9, 31 (2006); Lynn P. Harrison 3rd & Jerrold L. Bregman, Chapter 15 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code: A Hands-On
Guide to the New World Order of Ancillary and Cross-Border Cases, 887 PLI/COMM
869, 873 (2006).
180. Council Regulation 1346/2000, 2000 O.J. (L160) 1 (EC) [hereinafter EC Regulation].
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efficient operation of international insolvencies.181 Under this regulation,
there are two kinds of insolvency proceedings that can be opened: main
proceedings and secondary proceedings.182 Main proceedings can only be
opened in the member state in which a debtor has the center of his interests, and secondary proceedings can be opened in any other member state
in which “the debtor has an establishment.”183 While secondary proceedings may run parallel to main proceedings, a secondary proceeding can
only affect the assets located in the member state in which it is opened.184
In order to maintain stability among the various proceedings, the court
which has jurisdiction over a main proceeding is able to “order provisional and protective measures from the time of the request to open proceedings.”185 This ability includes the power to order protective measures
as to assets belonging to the debtor that are located in another member
state.186 The regulation has clearly stated the purpose and import of these
provisions: “to guarantee the effectiveness of the insolvency proceedings.”187
Perhaps the most important section of the EC Regulation is Article 4:
Law Applicable. This section sets forth provisions describing which
member state’s laws predominate in situations in which the laws of multiple member states conflict with one another.188 Specifically, this article
grants power to the member state in which a main proceeding is open to
determine which assets make up the debtor’s estate and “the effects of
the insolvency proceedings on proceedings brought by individual creditors.”189 The effect of this article is that if the member state in which the
main proceeding is taking place has a stay provision (automatic or otherwise), that stay applies in every other member state. The only exception to this rule is with regard to lawsuits already pending.190 Under Article 15 of the EC Regulation, if a lawsuit is pending in one state and a
main proceeding opens in another, the law of the first state shall apply
with regard to the pending proceeding.191

181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

Id. Recital (2).
Id. Recital (12).
Id.
Id.
Id. Recital (16).
EC Regulation, supra note 180, Recital (16).
Id.
Id. art. 4.
Id. art. 4(2)(b), 4(2)(f).
Id. art. 4(2)(f).
Id. art. 15.
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B. UNCITRAL
In 1997, UNCITRAL adopted its Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency (“Model Law”).192 In adopting this Model Law, UNCITRAL, in
keeping with its “mandate to further the progressive harmonization and
unification of the law of international trade,”193 sought to “provide effective mechanisms for dealing with cases of cross-border insolvency.”194
Specifically, the Model Law is designed to encourage cooperation among
bankruptcy courts from different countries, promote “fair and efficient
administration” of international insolvencies, and maximize the value of
the debtor’s assets for the benefit of all interested parties.195
According to Article 1, the Model Law should apply in two situations:
when a foreign court or representative is seeking the assistance of the
state which has enacted the law, or when the state which has enacted the
law is seeking assistance in a foreign state.196 The Model Law, like the
EC Regulation, is based on the premise that there are two kinds of foreign proceedings: foreign main proceedings and foreign non-main proceedings.197 These definitions are virtually the same as those provided by
the EC Regulation: a foreign main proceeding is a proceeding in a foreign state in which the debtor has the “centre of its main interests,”198
whereas a foreign non-main proceeding is a proceeding (aside from the
main proceeding) in a state in which “the debtor has an establishment.”199
The crux of UNCITRAL’s Model Law, as relevant to international
automatic stay enforcement, is that the Law allows a representative of a
foreign main proceeding to apply for recognition within a state that has
adopted the Model Law.200 Most importantly, once a State operating under the Model Law recognizes a foreign main proceeding, an automatic
stay goes into effect and prohibits the commencement or continuation of
actions against the debtor, as well as any other act of “execution against
the debtor’s assets.”201 This idea seems to be at the heart of what the
192. UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, available at
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/insolven/insolvency-e.pdf (last visited Aug. 1,
2007) [hereinafter UNCITRAL Model Law].
193. Id. Annex para. 1, at 76.
194. Id. Preamble at 7.
195. Id. Preamble (c) at 7.
196. Id. art. 1(a)–(b).
197. Id. art 2(a)–(c).
198. UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 192, art 2(b).
199. Id. art 2(c). The term “Establishment” is defined in Article 2(f) as “any place of
operations where the debtor carries out a non-transitory economic activity with human
beings and good or services.”
200. Id. art.15.
201. Id. art. 20(1).
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United States is looking for in claiming extraterritorial application of its
automatic stay. However, it is crucial to note than an important exception
exists in Article 6 of the Model Law which allows a country to decline to
recognize a foreign proceeding or afford it rights regarding a stay if doing so would be contrary to the policy considerations of that country.202
VI. AN ANSWER FOR THE UNITED STATES?
A. The Adoption of UNCITRAL’s Model Law: 11 U.S.C. §§ 1501–1527
It seems obvious that the United States views UNCITRAL’s Model
Law as a step in the right direction based on the recent addition of Chapter 15 to the United States Bankruptcy Code.203 This chapter, entitled
“Ancillary and Other Cross-Border Cases,”204 is directly based on
UNCITRAL’s Model Law.205 Like the Model Law, the purpose of Chapter 15 is to “provide effective mechanisms for dealing with cases of
cross-border insolvency.”206 Chapter 15 applies in four situations: 1)
when a foreign court or representative seeks assistance in the United
States in connection to a foreign insolvency; 2) when a foreign court or
representative seeks assistance in connection with a case proceeding under U.S. bankruptcy law; 3) when foreign and domestic bankruptcy cases
concerning the same debtor are proceeding concurrently; or 4) when interested parties in a foreign country have some interest in participating in
or requesting the commencement of a case under Chapter 15.207 There
are also several exceptions set out in section 1501(c),208 but the bottom
line is that “a foreign corporation that is not a railroad or a banking institution and that has a residence, domicile, place of business, or property in
the United States can obtain relief under Chapter 15.”209
As is the case with UNCTIRAL’s Model Law, Chapter 15 operates
largely on the premise that foreign proceedings must be classified either
as foreign main proceedings or as foreign non-main proceedings.210 The

202. Id. art 6.
203. Elkin, supra note 179 at 15. While Chapter 15 first became effective on October
17, 2005, it was signed into law on April 20, 2005 as part of the Bankruptcy Abuse, Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005. Id.
204. 11 U.S.C. § 1501 (2005).
205. Elkin, supra note 179 at 15.
206. 11 U.S.C § 1501(a) (2005).
207. 11 U.S.C. § 1501(b)(1)–(4) (2005).
208. 11. U.S.C. § 1501(c) (2005).
209. Elkin, supra note 179 at 17. See also 11 U.S.C. § 1501(c) (2005).
210. 11 U.S.C. § 1502(4)–(5) (2005); Elkin, supra note 179 at 24 (“One of the most
significant provisions of Chapter 15 adopted from the European Insolvency Regulation
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definitions of foreign main proceeding and foreign non-main proceeding
are the same under Chapter 15 as they are under UNCITRAL’s Model
Law.211 Additionally, the stay provisions in Chapter 15 operate just as
their counterparts do in the Model Law: under § 1519, a foreign representative can request a stay once a petition for recognition is filed,212 and
under § 1520, an automatic stay goes into effect as soon as recognition of
a foreign main proceeding is granted.213 This automatic stay “applies
immediately with respect to the debtor and all property of the debtor that
is located within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States.214
However, looking to the Model Law and Chapter 15 to ensure extraterritorial recognition of the U.S. automatic stay presents several major
problems. Primarily, only twelve countries in addition to the United
States have adopted the Model Law at this point in time.215 With only
twelve other countries signed on, proceedings against a U.S. debtor will
only be stayed to any degree of certainty (assuming the U.S. proceeding
is recognized as a foreign main proceeding) in those twelve countries.
Moreover, there is nothing stopping even those countries that have
adopted the Model Law from failing to grant a stay if doing so would be
contrary to the public policy of that country.216 Since foreign countries
promulgated by the European Union . . . is the concept of determining whether a foreign
proceeding is a ‘main’ or ‘non-main’ proceeding.”).
211. See UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 192, art. 2(a)–(c); 11 U.S.C. § 1502(4)–
(5) (2005) (defining a foreign main proceeding as “a foreign proceeding pending in the
country where the debtor has the center of its main interests” and a foreign non-main
proceeding as “a foreign proceeding, other than a foreign main proceeding, pending in a
country where the debtor has an establishment.” An establishment, as set out in 11 U.S.C.
§ 1502(2), means “any place of operations where the debtor carries out a nontransitory
economic activity.”).
212. 11 U.S.C. § 1519(a)(1) (2005).
213. 11 U.S.C. § 1520(a)(1) (2005). Note that this section imposes an automatic stay
governed by 11 U.S.C. § 362—the same automatic stay provision that governs all domestic bankruptcy proceedings.
214. 11 U.S.C. § 1520, n.2 (2005). Unlike the automatic stay initiated by the filing of a
domestic bankruptcy petition, this automatic stay specifically does not claim worldwide
jurisdiction, but limits itself to the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. It seems
that because a main proceeding has been recognized abroad and the Chapter 15 proceeding is merely ancillary, worldwide application of this automatic stay is unnecessary.
215. See UNCITRAL, Status, 1997—Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency,
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/insolvency/1997Model_status.html
(listing Columbia (2006), Erita (no year specified), Japan (2000), Mexico (2000), New
Zealand (2006), Poland (2003), Romania (2003), Montenegro (2002), Serbia (2004);
South Africa (2000), Great Britain (2006), and British Virgin Islands, overseas territory
of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (2005)) (last visited Aug. 1,
2007).
216. 11 U.S.C. § 1506 (2005); UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 192, art. 6.
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have vastly different insolvency codes and foreign and domestic value
systems than does the United States, it seems evident that the “catch-all”
policy exception will create inconsistency in the application of the Model
Law from country to country. Because of this exception, the United
States would be in essentially the same position it is now: it would need
to rely on the discretion of foreign courts in order to attain extraterritorial
recognition of its automatic stay. Since that is the unfavorable situation
the United States is seeking to avoid, relying on UNCITRAL’s Model
Law—though a step in the right direction—is an inadequate solution.
B. Looking Further: A Convention is the Key
Another possible solution is for the United States to seek a treaty or
convention resembling the EC Regulation discussed above.217 If the
United States became a party to such a treaty, its ultimate goal would be
achieved: the § 362 automatic stay would apply within the boundaries of
all other signing countries provided that the U.S. proceeding is the main
proceeding in any given case.218 While this approach also requires action
on the part of foreign countries in that those countries would have to sign
the convention, the United States would be taking an active role in soliciting signatures rather than the passive role of waiting for the rest of the
world to adopt UNCITRAL’s Model Law. Furthermore, it seems plausible that other countries would be amenable to such a convention given
that the EC Regulation already exists, and various countries—as evidenced by the growing popularity of the UNCITRAL’s Model Law—are
now thinking more carefully about how to best handle cross-border insolvencies in our global marketplace.
However, this solution too is imperfect. The § 362 automatic stay is far
more sweeping and inclusive than the stay provisions of many other
countries, including most of the EU countries discussed above.219 Therefore, it seems plausible that other countries with less-inclusive stay provisions may not want the United States as a member to such a treaty for
fear of having a very broad stay provision thrust upon them should a
main proceeding open in the United States. Additionally, the EC Regulation has an important exception for suits already pending: if a main proceeding were to open in the United States with a non-main proceeding
already pending in another signing country, the laws of that other country
would determine whether the pending proceedings should be stayed.220
217.
218.
219.
220.

EC Regulation, supra note 180.
Id. art. 4.
See supra Part IV.A.
EC Regulation, supra note 180, art. 15.
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This notion is contrary to the § 362 automatic stay.221 If the United States
were to pursue an international convention to ensure extraterritorial recognition of its automatic stay, it would most likely have to be willing to
compromise the rigidity and inclusiveness of § 362 so as to make the
convention appealing to potential signers. However, even with these
drawbacks, pursuing such a convention seems like a favorable option in
order to ensure that U.S. debtors are protected when their insolvency
proceedings reach beyond the territorial boundaries of the United States.
CONCLUSION
The automatic stay in 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) is an essential component of
the U.S. insolvency process. The automatic stay mandates that once a
debtor has filed a bankruptcy petition in the United States, no creditor
may initiate or continue any proceedings against that debtor or otherwise
make a claim to any of the debtor’s property.222 In order to best protect
debtors and creditors in our expanding global marketplace, U.S. courts
have continually held that the automatic stay applies even to foreign
creditors and to property located outside the territorial boundaries of the
United States.223 However, this holding creates problems in situations in
which either a foreign creditor seizes a U.S. debtor’s assets such that a
U.S. court cannot impose sanctions upon the creditor, or a foreign court
refuses to recognize that property within its own territorial jurisdiction is
subject to the control of U.S. courts.224 In short, the extraterritorial reach
of the automatic stay operates well in theory but can falter in its practical
application.
Although there is no clear or perfect answer to this problem, several international bodies have adopted policies that could serve as a solution.
One possibility is UNCITRAL’s Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency.225 Relying on the Model Law seems like an attractive prospect
because Article 20 states that once a state operating under the Model
Law recognizes a foreign main proceeding, an automatic stay goes into
effect that prohibits the commencement or continuation of actions
against the debtor or any other act of “execution against the debtor’s assets.”226 However, the Model Law’s effectiveness in protecting the extraterritorial application of the U.S. automatic stay is wholly dependent on
221. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2005).
222. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2005).
223. See supra note 24.
224. See, e.g., Sinatra v. Gucci (In re Gucci), 309 B.R. 679, 684 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
2004); Nakash v. Zur (In re Nakash), 190 B.R. 763, 767 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996).
225. UNCITRAL Model Law, supra note 192.
226. Id. art. 20(1).

2007] EXTRATERRITORIAL REACH OF THE AUTOMATIC STAY 307
other countries opting to adopt the Model law; thus far, only twelve other
countries have done so.227 Furthermore, even if every other country in the
world were to adopt the Model Law, it contains a catch-all provision enabling a country to decline to recognize a foreign proceeding or stay provision if doing so would be contrary to the policy considerations of that
country.228
A more attractive prospective solution is for the United States to seek a
treaty or convention resembling EC Regulation 1346/2000.229 Under the
EC Regulation, once a given proceeding is categorized as a main proceeding, the automatic stay of the country in which the main proceeding
is pending applies in all other member states.230 Under such a convention, if a main proceeding is pending in the United States, the § 362
automatic stay would apply in all other signing countries. There is an
exception in the EC Regulation to this rule that excludes suits already
pending,231 but this may be a small price for the United States to pay in
order to ensure extraterritorial recognition of its automatic stay in the
vast majority of situations.
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